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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 25. Contemporary Acquisition Issues 
Thursday, May 17, 2012  
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: Harry Hallock, Deputy Director, Army Contracting Command 
Applying the Three C’s of Sustainable Development to Defense Department 
Planning 
Elliot Maltz, Willamette University 
Past Performance as an Indicator of Future Performance: Selecting an Industry 
Partner to Maximize the Probability of Program Success 
James Bradshaw and Su Chang 
The MITRE Corporation 
Contracting Officer Workload and Contingency Contracting: Evidence From 
the Department of Defense 
Patrick Warren and Nancy Huff 
Clemson University 
Harry Hallock—Mr. Hallock became deputy director of the U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC), 
a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), on October 3, 2011. 
ACC, headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, AL, includes two subordinate commands, the Mission and 
Installation Contracting Command and the Expeditionary Contracting Command; and six major 
contracting centers that support AMC’s other major subordinate and life cycle management 
commands. ACC provides global contracting support to warfighters through the full spectrum of 
military operations. ACC consists of more than 5,800 military and civilian personnel worldwide who 
awarded and managed nearly 198,000 contractual actions valued at an estimated $86.8 billion in 
fiscal year 2011. 
Mr. Hallock previously served as executive director of the ACC Contracting Center in Warren, MI. 
As the senior civilian procurement authority, he also advised the Tank-Automotive and Armaments 
Command (TACOM) Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) commanding general on the total 
acquisition process, including policy development, compliance and review, contract pricing, contract 
management, and associated support. 
At ACC-Warren, Mr. Hallock oversaw warfighting readiness for the Soldier by providing 
contracting and acquisition support for combat and tactical vehicle systems, deployment and Soldier 
support equipment, and armament. He directed more than 800 civilian and military personnel located 
at six separate geographic sites and who administer more than $119 billion in active contracts. Since 
fiscal year 2007, the contracting center has executed more than 113,536 contract actions totaling 
$100.2 billion in obligations. Mr. Hallock was responsible for contracting offices located at Rock Island 
Arsenal, IL; Anniston Army Depot, AL; Red River Army Depot, TX; Sierra Army Depot, CA; and 
Watervliet Arsenal, NY; as well as the headquarters in Warren, MI. 
Mr. Hallock was appointed to the senior executive service on May 13, 2007. Before his 
appointment, he served as the associate director for operations, and prior to that as chief of the 
research and development (R&D) and the installation support contracting division in Warren, MI. 
Mr. Hallock holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Delaware in Newark, DE, and a 
master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act Level III certified in Contracting, Program Management and Logistics. 
Mr. Hallock has received the Department of the Army Achievement Medal for Civilian Service and the 
Department of the Army Commander’s Award for Public Service. 
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Contracting Officer Workload and Contingency 
Contracting: Evidence From the Department of Defense1 
Patrick Warren—Warren is an assistant professor of economics at Clemson University and received 
his PhD in economics from MIT in 2008. He studies the economics of organizations, with a focus on 
decisions in public-sector and non-profit organizations. [patrick.lee.warren@gmail.com] 
Nancy Huff—Huff is a PhD student in economics at Clemson University, graduating in May 2012. 
She works in industrial organization, focusing on procurement and subcontracting. In the summer of 
2012 she is joining the Institute for Defense Analyses. [nmvogh@gmail.com] 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between endogenously incomplete contracts and the 
selection of procurement terms. We take advantage of variation in the workload of 
Department of Defense (DoD) contracting officers to estimate the relationship between 
contractual incompleteness and procurement outcomes, such as the use of competitive 
acquisitions procedures and the risk of renegotiation. In a sample of 4.6 million contracts from 
32 DoD procurement offices over six years, increases in the cost of writing complete 
contracts led to decreased reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, increased reliance 
on firm-fixed-price contracts, increased risk of renegotiation, and increased total costs of 
procurement. Although the effect of limited acquisitions capacity on contingency contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan has generated a lot of concern recently, we find that, if anything, these 
contracts are a little less responsive to workload. The DoD’s acquisitions manpower has not 
kept up with the exceptional growth in the level of acquisitions contracting over the past 
decade. This paper clarifies some of the potential economic consequences of the resulting 
increase in workload faced by DoD contracting officers. 
Introduction 
Defense contracting is characterized by a high level of uncertainty due to 
unpredictable changes in both technology and demand. Writing and managing well-specified 
contracts in this uncertain environment is necessarily time consuming; contracting officers 
must allocate their limited time-budget among the contracting tasks at hand. If contracting 
officers’ responsibilities expand to include additional tasks, then they must decrease the 
average amount of time spent on each task, constraining them to leave some potential 
eventualities unaddressed. In this paper, we investigate how changes in the workload of 
contracting officers relate to the equilibrium level of contractual completeness and the use of 
other procurement terms, including award type, pricing structure, the use of competition, the 
probability of renegotiation, and the final price paid. 
After briefly outlining the procurement process in the Department of Defense (DoD), 
we review a model from Warren (2012) that extends Bajari and Tadelis (2001) to understand 
how varying workload affects the choice of contractual completeness and contractual terms. 
This model predicts that busier contracting officers write less complete contracts, so the risk 
of renegotiation increases as fewer contingencies are fully specified. The increased need for 
contract modifications raises the cost of using fixed-price contracts, so higher workload 
causes contracting officers to shift to more flexible cost-plus contracts. The higher risk of 
renegotiation also means that the benefit of competitive acquisitions falls because 
competition only identifies the most efficient contractor for the original contract specification. 
As a result, the model predicts that busier contractors shift to less competitive acquisitions 
procedures. All of these individual effects of higher workload—higher risk of renegotiation, 
                                                
1 JEL Classification: D23, D82, H11, H57. 
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reduced use of fixed-price contracts, and reduced use of competitive acquisitions 
procedures—increase the expected price of any given project. 
In line with this model, we analyzed a sample of 4.6 million contracts from a panel of 
32 DoD procurement offices over the years 2005–2010. Consistent with the model 
described in Warren (2012), we found that exogenous increases in contracting officer 
workload that increase the cost of contractual completeness decrease the use of 
competition, increase the probability of renegotiation, and increase the total costs of 
procurement. Curiously, we found that higher workload increases the use of firm-fixed-price 
contracts. In addition, we found that higher workloads induce contracting officers to use 
more delivery orders (calls on an existing contract) and fewer new definitive contracts. 
One subset of procurement that has received a lot of attention in recent years is 
contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The congressionally appointed Commission 
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC; 2011) estimates that between $31 2 
billion and $60 billion were lost to waste and fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan. In their report on 
wartime contracting, the CWC (2011) attributes part of this waste and fraud to an insufficient 
number of acquisitions personnel, stating that “agencies continue to lack sufficient staff and 
resources to enable adequate management of all aspects of contingency contracting.” In 
light of these concerns, we separately examined the impact of changing workloads on a 
subsample of contracts procured in Iraq and Afghanistan. We found that higher workloads 
do have important implications for the procurement terms of these contingency contracts, 
but the effects on contingency contracts are not dissimilar to the effects of increased 
workload on the remainder of (non-contingency) contracts. In fact, with the exception of 
competition, changes in workload have a lesser effect on the procurement terms for 
contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan than they do for other contracts. Hence, the 
personnel problems for Iraq and Afghanistan contracts identified by the CWC may be even 
more important for the domestic procurement policy of the DoD. 
The acquisitions community has expressed concern about the growth of contracting 
straining the capacity of the acquisitions workforce. The DoD’s procurement obligations 
have increased from $270.7 billion in FY2005 to $367.7 billion in FY2010, a 36% increase 
over these six years.2 In contrast, the DoD’s contracting workforce grew from 26,025 in 
FY2005 to 29,792 in FY2010—an increase of only 14% over the same six-year period.3 
Moreover, relative to the DoD civilian workforce as a whole, the civilian acquisitions 
workforce has a disproportionate share of employees near or at full retirement eligibility.4 
The acquisitions community worries that the increasingly strained contracting workforce will 
be unable to adequately specify and manage contracts, leading to increased susceptibility to 
fraud, reduced bargaining power in negotiations, and excessive dependence on private 
contractors. Rau and Stambersky (2009) report that less than 15% of surveyed senior 
contracting officers at the Army Contracting Command believed that there were sufficient 
acquisition management positions in their installation, and only 23% believed that contractor 
performance on service contracts received the proper level of oversight. The Report of the 
Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the U.S. 
Congress (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007), Chapter 5, stated that “inadequacy in the 
acquisition workforce” wastes government resources and produces unsatisfactory 
                                                
2 FPDS-NG (available at www.usaspending.gov). 
3 FY10 Defense Acquisition Workforce Summary Data (available at 
https://dap.dau.mil/workforce/Pages/Default.aspx). 
4 See Gates, Keating, Jewell, Daugherty, Tysinger, Robbert , and Masi (2008) for a complete analysis of these 
trends in the DoD acquisitions workforce. 
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contractual outcomes.5 We address these concerns in this paper and provide evidence for 
the consequences of limited contracting capacity on acquisitions outcomes. 
In addition to addressing a relevant policy question, this paper also contributes to the 
academic literature on incomplete contracting. Most of the existing literature, summarized in 
the Determinants of Procurement Terms section of this paper, either treats the level of 
completeness as exogenous or identifies exogenous differences in the inherent complexity 
of projects that shift the cost of contractual completeness. In this paper, we follow the 
approach introduced by Warren (2012), taking advantage of variation in the workload of 
contracting officers as a shifter of the cost of contractual completeness to estimate the 
relationship between contract specificity and the selection of contractual terms. Our results 
are generally consistent with those of Warren as well as the broader literature. 
In the rest of this section, we put the paper in context, both in terms of the existing 
literature and the policy environment. In the section A Model of Procurement, we review the 
model from Warren (2012) that predicts the effects of workload on contractual completeness 
and procurement terms. In the Data and Methodology section, we discuss the data and the 
empirical approach. In the Results section, we present our empirical results, and in the 
Conclusion, we present our concluding remarks. 
Determinants of Procurement Terms 
For a summary of economics literature on the determinants of contractual form, see 
Lafontaine and Slade (forthcoming). Several papers have investigated the determinants of 
the specific features of procurement contracts examined here. The general approach taken 
in this paper, where contractual completeness is endogenously determined and, in turn, 
affects the other contractual provisions, was pioneered by Goldberg (1977) and formalized 
by Bajari and Tadelis (2001). The particular techniques employed here were first applied in 
a modified form to civilian agencies by Warren (2012). 
This framework has been used to investigate the decision to open a contract to 
competition, often couched in terms of “auctions versus negotiations.” Several papers look 
at how the use of competitive procurement methods is affected by differences in 
completeness driven by the underlying difficulty of the project. In the context of private 
construction contracts, Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2008) found that more complex 
projects are procured less competitively and, holding complexity fixed, competitive 
procurements are more likely to be renegotiated. Gil and Oudot (2008) found similar results 
in the context of French defense procurements, at least within a given buyer-seller 
relationship, as did Leffler, Rucker, and Munn (2007), in the context of private timber sales. 
Warren (2012) took a different approach, looking for differences in completeness induced by 
exogenous variation in the opportunity cost of the contracting officer’s time due to changes 
in workload, and found that in civilian agencies of the U.S. federal government, higher 
workloads decrease the use of competition. We extend Warren’s analysis to DoD agencies 
and contingency contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular. We found that increasing 
workload decreases the use of competitive acquisitions procedures; this effect is even larger 
for procurement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                                
5 See also the large body of work by the GAO: High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO-05-207, January 2005); DoD 
Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes (GAO-06-800T, September 2006); Contract Management: DoD 
Vulnerabilities to Contracting Fraud, Waste and Abuse (GAO-06-838R, July 2006); Defense Acquisitions: 
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs (GAO-06-391, March 2006); Defense Acquisitions: DoD Has 
Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (GAO-06-66, December 2005); 
Defense Management: DoD Needs to Demonstrate that Performance-Based Logistics Contracts are 
Achieving Expected Benefits (GAO-05-966, September 2005). 
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Parallel to the literature on “auctions versus negotiations” is the literature on pricing 
terms, often characterized as “fixed price versus cost plus.” In the context of timber auctions, 
Leffler and Rucker (1991) found that simpler-to-specify tracts are more likely to be sold at 
fixed prices. Kalnins and Mayer (2004) found that when quality is difficult to measure, so 
difficult to contract on, the IT services industry uses more cost-plus contracts. Corts and 
Singh (2004) found that oil exploration companies increase their use of cost-plus contract for 
drilling contractors as their experience with those contractors grows, and posited that this 
change occurs because opportunities for repeat business strengthen the incentives for 
efficiency more than they reduce the costs of specifying complete contracts. Crocker and 
Reynolds (1993) found the opposite pattern, in the context of Air Force engine procurement, 
and argued that as the buyer gains more information over time, it becomes easier to write 
complete contingent contracts. Warren (2012) demonstrated that for civilian agencies, 
contracting officers with higher workloads—and therefore higher opportunity costs of 
specifying any given contract—use fewer fixed-price contracts. We found the opposite 
results in defense agencies: contracting officers in the DoD with higher workloads increase 
their usage of fixed-price contracts. 
Finally, a very few studies have directly targeted the question of the costs and 
incidence of renegotiation and contractual incompleteness, independent of the contractual 
terms outlined above. Guasch, Laffont, and Straub (2008) found that concession contracts 
in Latin America are more likely to be renegotiated if the firm is not regulated or if the quality 
of the bureaucracy that oversees the concession is low. Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis 
(2010) used a structural approach to analyze a set of California highway procurement 
auctions, and found that ex-post adaptation costs make up between 7–13% of the winning 
bid. Warren (2012) showed that increasing workload in civilian contracting agencies leads to 
more renegotiation and higher prices. Consistent with these results, we found that 
increasing workload in defense agencies increases the probability and frequency of contract 
modification as well as the prices paid by the defense agency; these effects are even 
greater for domestic contracts than for contingency contracts. 
Many papers have looked at issues related specifically to procurement for defense 
agencies, including a high level of uncertainty, large economies of scale, and the potential 
for problems in the monopsony market for weapons systems. Rogerson (1995) and Hartley 
(2007) provide excellent overviews of the literature relating to defense procurement. 
However, the academic literature has paid very little attention to defense procurement in 
conflict areas. We rectified this omission by investigating the impact of changing workloads 
on procurement outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. We found that, relative to domestic 
defense contracts, workload has a greater impact on the usage of competitive acquisitions, 
but a smaller impact on other procurement terms, including award type, pricing terms, risk of 
renegotiation, and financial obligations. These results suggest that increasing the 
acquisitions workforce may not have as large an impact on contingency contracts. 
In summary, this paper contributes to contract literature and expands our 
understanding of contingency contracting. Using extensive data on contracts and 
employment from the DoD, and taking advantage of workload, a new technique for 
identifying contractual incompleteness only recently introduced by Warren (2012), our 
results regarding the effect of incomplete contracts on contractual terms are generally 
consistent with the broader literature. 
The DoD Procurement Process 
The DoD’s basic procurement process progresses in three stages. The process 
begins with the recognition of an agency need and the development of a procurement 
strategy intended to meet the need. It continues with the solicitation and award stage, and 
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ends with the contract management and closeout stage (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2003, 
pp. 27–30). In highly uncertain environments, the DoD uses a modified version of this basic 
procurement process. We characterize the basic three-stage procurement process in this 
section and describe two common modifications of this process in our Complex Contracting 
Environments section. 
In the first stage, the agency determines that it has a need for a product (or service) 
that it cannot or does not wish to produce with “in-house” resources. A contracting officer 
employed with the agency then determines the optimal strategy for successfully procuring 
the desired product within the constraints of authorizing legislation, current market 
conditions, and the requirements of both the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The agency must decide 
whether and how to compete the contract, the preferred pricing terms, and whether the 
contract will be for a definitive quantity or some indefinite-delivery vehicle. 
After the agency determines the method of procurement and contractual form, it 
solicits bids from potential suppliers. The agency uses various means to request bids from 
potential contractors, including the Federal Business Opportunities website. The request for 
bids includes a description of the product or service the agency wishes to purchase, the 
contractors that are allowed to submit an offer, the form that these offers should take, and 
how the agency intends to evaluate the offers. As dictated by the agency’s solicitation, 
contractors may respond with a simple price bid, a more complicated proposal, or even 
engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the agency that include exchanges of 
proposals. The agency evaluates these proposals according to the provisions in the 
solicitation and an award is made. 
Once the contract is awarded, production begins, and the agency begins the contract 
management stage. The agency oversees production, inspecting for quality, adherence to 
specifications, and auditing costs when appropriate. If unforeseen contingencies arise 
during production, the agency may choose to modify the original contract. These 
modifications may take the form of simple unilateral changes to the specifications or, in the 
case of significant changes, may require bilateral negotiations to determine an equitable 
adjustment of pricing. Finally, the contract is ended, either because the contract terms were 
fulfilled or because the agency terminated the contract for one of many possible reasons, 
including convenience or contractor default. 
Complex Contracting Environments 
When the procurement environment is particularly complex, the DoD uses a modified 
form of the procurement process described in the previous section. There are two main 
forms this advanced process can take: multi-stage procurements and umbrella contracts. 
For complex items with large economies of scale, such as weapons systems, the 
DoD typically uses multi-stage procurements that repeat the basic procurement process 
described above in each stage. The following discussion of multiple-stage contracts is 
adapted largely from Rogerson (1995) who describes three procurement phases in a 
product life cycle. The first stage is a design stage, in which the agency awards cost-plus 
contracts to several firms who research and develop competing designs. The design stage 
has the most competition of the three stages, because, even though uncertainty about the 
final product is high, economies of scale are relatively low and the competition in research 
and development enables the agency to identify the best design. At the end of the design 
phase, the agency selects the two best designs to continue to the sole-source selection 
phase. 
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In the sole-source selection stage, the remaining two firms build prototypes, present 
final design plans, and submit bids for the initial production. Because relatively small 
quantities of most weapons systems are ever purchased, it is usually unprofitable for more 
than one firm to produce a particular weapon system. Therefore, at the conclusion of this 
stage, this agency will generally award production rights to only one firm. 
The final phase of weapons procurement is the production stage. Even at this stage, 
large uncertainties persist because of the probable changes in both technology and the 
DoD’s demand for the product, making long-term fixed-price production contracts 
impractical. Instead, the DoD typically relies on repeated fixed-price contracts that are 
signed for one year of production at a time. Because of the large economies of scale, these 
contracts are almost always negotiated in a sole-source environment, preventing 
competitive determination of prices. As a result, the government typically bases prices for 
these production contracts on historical and projected costs with the inclusion of a “profit” 
term. Moreover, the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requires contractors to submit “current 
accurate and complete” cost estimates during negotiations of the contracted price. The 
combination of cost-based pricing and TINA means that small cost savings will only benefit 
contractors for one year before the cost savings are priced into the next contract, and 
unprecedentedly large cost savings may open contractors up to prosecution for hiding 
information and require them to refund these savings back to the DoD. In this environment, 
fixed-price contracts may not have any advantage over cost-plus contracts: the contractor 
has little incentive to provide cost-saving effort, and high uncertainty makes renegotiation 
likely. 
The second major modified procurement form is the use of umbrella contracts. When 
an agency knows it will need a large quantity of some relatively standardized service or 
product, but the quantity is unknown, the agency may choose to write an indefinite-delivery 
vehicle (IDV), which specifies basic information about the desired good or service. The IDV 
then acts as a framework for future contracts. When the agency determines it needs the 
product or service, it makes a “call” on the corresponding IDV, filling in the incremental 
details, such as time, place, and manner of delivery. Agencies can make repeated calls on 
the same IDV. The advantage of an IDV is the ability to shortcut several stages in the 
procurement process; contracting officers do not have to re-specify and award the contract 
repeatedly for the same service. However, the IDV may not be well specified for every 
circumstance that generates a call on it, potentially creating the need for costly 
modifications. One prominent example of an IDV is the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP), which provides broad logistics support to the U.S. Army including 
delivery of food supplies, postal services, and facilities maintenance. The most recent 
iteration, LOGCAP IV, was awarded in 2007 to three firms with a maximum value to each 
company of $5 billion annually for up to 10 years. 
Contracting Officers 
The primary DoD agents responsible for overseeing this procurement process are 
civil service employees in the occupational series GS-1102, generally referred to as 
contracting officers. The Position Classification Standard for the Contracting Series 
describes their role as follows: 
This series includes positions that manage, supervise, perform, or develop 
policies and procedures for professional work involving the procurement of 
supplies, services, construction, or research and development using formal 
advertising or negotiation procedures; the evaluation of contract price 
proposals; and the administration or termination and close out of contracts. 
The work requires knowledge of the legislation, regulations, and methods 
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used in contracting; and knowledge of business and industry practices, 
sources of supply, cost factors, and requirements characteristics. 
There are a number of military and civilian support personnel that aid these 
contracting officers in the procurement process, including purchasing officers (GS-1105s, 
who concentrate on simplified acquisitions), procurement clerical and assistance series (GS-
1106s, who provide clerical support), and contracting officer representatives and contracting 
officer technical representatives (various series, who develop the contract’s technical 
requirements and determine if a contractor meets them). We only use ceteris paribus 
variation in the number of the civilian (GS-1102) contracting officers to measure changes in 
workload. 
In the next section, we describe a model of the procurement process (details in 
Warren [2012]) that trace the effects of workload shock on procurement and contracting 
outcomes. 
A Model of Procurement 
This paper’s predictions about the effect of workload on contractual completeness 
and procurement terms are derived from the model presented in Warren (2012) that extends 
the analysis in Bajari and Tadelis (2001) of the choice between fixed-price and cost-plus 
contracts to also include the choice between competition and negotiation. We present 
Warren’s basic results in this section and invite the interested reader to follow up on the 
details in the original. 
In Warren’s model of the procurement process, the primary agent is a contracting 
officer who maximizes a utility function that depends on three elements: the value of the 
product or service, net of payments to the contractor; the cost of specifying contractual 
contingencies; and the cost of running a procurement competition.6 The contracting officer 
chooses three variable characteristics of the contract: the level of contractual completeness, 
the pricing terms of the contract (i.e., fixed price or cost plus), and whether to run an open 
competition or to engage in negotiations with a single firm. 
The value the contracting officer places on the product to be procured is exogenous 
and not affected by contracting terms. The final payment is dependent on the initial 
obligation, pricing terms, and the probability of renegotiation. The contracting officer has a 
choice of specifying a level of contractual completeness to cover potential contingencies: 
higher levels of contractual completeness reduce the probability that the contracting officer 
will have to engage in post-award renegotiations for off-contract performance. The 
contracting officer bears an exogenously given level of workload on other projects. When his 
workload increases, his opportunity cost of more fully specifying the current contract also 
increases. 
In the event that a contract requires modification after production has started, the 
contracting officer faces two potential increases in cost. First, modifications should increase 
production costs on average since some costs are likely to be non-recoverable. Second, if 
the contracting officer chooses to award a fixed-price contract, then he must specify a 
modified contract and negotiate a new payment for this modified contract. We assume that 
the contracting officer must bear a friction cost associated with this re-specification and 
renegotiation of a fixed-price contract.7 
                                                
6 The contracting officer need not value the product or its price at the same rate as his political principle for the 
comparative statics to hold. All that is required is that he would prefer paying less to paying more, all else equal. 
7 In contrast, these frictions of renegotiation are completely avoidable with cost-plus contracts. 
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The primary purpose of this model is to predict the impact of an exogenous shift in 
the cost of contractual completeness induced by a change in the contracting officer’s 
workload. An increase in a contracting officer’s workload increases the marginal cost of 
completeness, necessarily reducing the equilibrium level of contractual completeness. This 
reduction of the optimal completeness will have important effects on the contracting officer’s 
other equilibrium choices as well as on his final financial outlay. 
Consider, first, the contracting officer’s choice between fixed-price and cost-plus 
contracts. The advantage of a fixed-price contract is the incentive it creates for contractors 
to efficiently provide non-contractible cost-reducing effort, since the contractor is the residual 
claimant on any cost savings. In contrast, cost-plus contracts do not produce incentives for 
cost-saving effort, since any reduction in costs will result in an equal reduction in payment to 
the contractor. Since the contractor and contracting officer anticipate this cost-saving effort, 
the initial obligation under a fixed-price contract will be lower than with a cost-plus contract. 
The advantage of cost-plus contracts is the ease of renegotiation when unspecified 
contingencies arise. Rather than negotiating a new price for a modified contract, the 
contracting officer only needs to compensate the contractor for additional costs according to 
the terms of the original contract. If a contract were fully specified so that there would be no 
possibility of modification, the contracting officer would always prefer a fixed-price contract. 
However, as increasing workload induces the contracting officer to specify less and less of 
the contract, the ease of renegotiation from cost-plus contracts becomes more attractive. At 
some threshold of incompleteness, cost-plus contracts may become optimal. 
Compare, next, the contracting officer’s choice between open competition and 
single-source negotiation. The advantage of competition is the ability to select an ex-ante 
more efficient contractor. However, the advantage of competition disappears when 
modification is certain, since the ex-ante more efficient contractor may not have the lowest 
costs on the modified contract. The advantage of negotiation is the convenience to forgo the 
time and expense of conducting an open competitive procurement. As contracts become 
less and less complete, the benefits of competition diminish without any decline in the cost 
of running a competition (if anything, the time cost has increased). Hence, a higher workload 
that reduces completeness will make single-source negotiations more appealing. 
Combining these results, we see that an exogenous increase in workload will induce 
the contracting officer to choose to write a less complete contract and increase his use of 
cost-plus contracts and single-source negotiations. These choices have important 
ramifications for both the initial contracted obligation and the final outlays. The initial price is 
affected by both the pricing terms and the extent of contract completeness. As 
completeness falls, the increased use of cost-plus contracts will result in fewer cost-saving 
efforts, and the increased use of negotiation will reduce the probability that the contracting 
officer will select the ex-ante most efficient contractor. Both of these effects will tend to 
increase the initial contracted price. 
The final outlay depends on the initial price and the probability of renegotiation. In the 
absence of any modification, the final outlay approximately equals the initial price, but 
reduced contractual completeness increases the probability that the contract will need to be 
modified. Since some costs are non-recoverable, a modification generates higher total costs 
on average, again leading to higher final outlays. Finally, the higher probability of 
modification means that even when the contracting officer still prefers to use a fixed-price 
contract, he has a higher probability of having to bear the cost of renegotiation frictions, 
increasing the expected final outlays. In summary, an exogenous increase in workload, 
which decreases the equilibrium level of completeness, increases the expected final outlays 
due to a higher initial price, reduced cost-saving efforts from increased used of cost-plus 
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contracts, and increased probability of renegotiation, which increases both expected 
production costs and expected contracting costs. 
In the empirical analysis below, we investigate and find evidence for the predicted 
effects of increased workload on the use of competition, the probability of renegotiation, 
initial obligations, and final outlays. The results on pricing terms conflict with the model. 
Data and Methodology 
We used a large public database of government contracts to build measures of 
workload and contractual/procurement terms. The contract data consisted of every non-
classified transaction from FY2005–FY2010 above a reporting threshold of $3,0008 for 32 
DoD contracting offices, about 6.9 million actions in all.9 Gathered from the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS-NG), through usaspending.gov, the contract data 
included procurement contract transactions reported directly through the contract writing 
systems of the constituent agencies. Each initial government obligation appeared exactly 
once (4.6 million), as did every modification of a reported contract (2.3 million). For each 
contract, the FPDS-NG reports a broad range of information about the contracting parties, 
the contractual terms, the method of procurement, and the place of performance. The 
particular provisions that form the basis for the analysis are discussed in detail in this 
section. 
We measured the number of contracting officers in an agency by counting the 
number of GS-1102s. The data on the GS-1102 employment in each contracting agency in 
each fiscal year came from the Office of Personnel Management’s Central Personnel Data 
File. It reports the number of civilian contracting officers in each agency at the end of each 
fiscal year by years of experience in that agency. 
Unfortunately, analysis of contracting in defense agencies has several complications 
that are not present for a similar analysis of civilian agencies (Warren, 2012). First, 
compared to civilian agencies, a larger share of defense contracts are classified for reasons 
of national security and are, thus, unreported. This missing-data issue had two implications 
for our analysis. First, we could only estimate effects for non-classified contracts and could 
say nothing concrete about whether these effects would also hold for classified contracts. 
Second, when estimating workload, we could only imperfectly control for the work on 
classified contracts. Contract counts for these classified contracts are not available, nor is 
budgetary information at the agency level. Instead, we controlled for the fraction of the 
branch procurement budget that is classified (from the OMB analysis of the DoD budget), 
where Army, Navy, and Air Force agencies are assigned the fraction for their branch and 
non-branch agencies are assigned the fraction classified of the non-branch DoD budget. 
Second, procurement work in some defense agencies is shared with career military 
officers, but the Central Personnel Data File includes only civilian contracting officers. The 
only publicly available data we could find on this question is available at the branch level at 
a single point of time. Since our regression includes agency fixed effects, a control like that 
would be dropped.10 
                                                
8 Original contracts below the $3,000 reporting threshold are known as “micropurchases,” and are exempted 
from a number of competition and reporting requirements. We dropped all reported original contracts below this 
threshold, because reporting rates of micropurchases may adjust with workload. 
9 This consists of every DoD agency/sub-agency that reports non-zero GS-1102s to the OPM and more 
than 300 original definitive contractual actions to the FPDS-NG, with a few exceptions. See Table 10 for the list 
of agencies included in our sample. 
10 The appropriate data are available from the Defense Manpower Data Center, we believe, but they are not 
publicly available, and we have not been able to gain access to them. 
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Finally, the contracts data from the FPDS-NG and the employment data from the 
Central Personnel Data File are reported at different levels within the DoD’s hierarchy. At the 
highest level, the DoD is divided into branches (e.g., Navy). These branches are subdivided 
into agencies (e.g., Naval Air Systems Command). Each of these agencies can be further 
subdivided into individual contracting offices. The FPDS-NG reports both the branch and the 
six-digit DoD Activity Address Code (DoDAAC) of the contracting office that issues each 
contract, but not the agency to which the contracting office belongs. The Central Personnel 
Data File reports employment of contracting officers only at the levels of the branch and the 
agency. To match the contracts to the appropriate employment information, we used the 
Defense Automatic Addressing System Inquiry System (DAASINQ)11 to identify the agency 
to which each contracting office belongs. For example, the FPDS-NG reports contracts from 
a contracting office with DoDAAC N65886 in the Navy. According to DAASINQ, N65886 is 
the DoDAAC of the Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, which belongs to the agency Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). Consequently, we assigned all contracts with DoDAAC 
N65886 to NAVAIR. We repeated this process for all contracts in the Navy, Army, and Air 
Force.12 
In the Appendix, Table 10 lists additional details about these corresponding 
agencies, including their distribution of contracts, number of contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, 
and number of contracting officers. 
Contractual Types and Terms 
Contractual characteristics vary immensely, even within a single agency. These 
contract characteristics can be divided into two main subsets: features over which 
contracting officers have little discretion and features over which contracting officers have 
more discretion. For example, contracting officers have little discretion over contract features 
such as product class, as these features are primarily determined by the nature of the good 
or service the agency wishes to acquire. Consequently, we primarily take these non-
discretionary characteristics (described in more detail in this section) as exogenously given, 
and ignore the possibility that the agency will adjust these features on the margin when 
workloads change. There is one aspect of the contract, award type, over which the 
contracting officer may have limited discretion at the margin. For most of the analysis, we 
treat award type as given, and return at the end to the question of substitution among award 
types. Finally, contracting officers have a great deal of discretion over other contracting 
features such as the nature of competition and pricing terms. When contracting officers’ 
workloads change, we looked for adjustments in the mix of these “discretionary” features. 
Specifically, we analyzed the effects of workload on four aspects of contracts: competition, 
pricing terms, modification, and outlays. 
Contracts differ first according to the product or service the agency is procuring. The 
General Services Administration classifies every product or service purchased by the U.S. 
federal government as one of 24 broad services classes or one of 90 broad product 
classes.13 
The FPDS-NG reports the primary product/service class of every contract. Some of 
these classes, such as Nuclear Ordinance, are not represented or are very small, so we 
                                                
11 Found online at https://www.daas.dla.mil/daasinq/ 
12 FPDS-NG reports the agency instead of the branch for contracts issued by all independent DoD agencies 
(e.g., the Defense Contract Management Agency). 
13 For definitions see http://www.acquisition.gov/service product codes.pdf 
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merge them with neighboring categories. After these combinations, there are 55 broad 
product/service categories.14 
Second, contracts differ according to the award type. Awards are first categorized by 
whether the contract specifies a fixed quantity (definitive contract) or not (indefinite delivery 
vehicle). Awards can also be categorized by whether they are original (i.e., new) contractual 
actions or modifications to existing contracts. For this paper, the unit of observation is the 
original contract. We do not consider the effect of workload on the contractual terms of 
modifications, because the terms of a modified contract depend in part on the terms 
specified in the original contract. Consequently, it is unclear whether the workload at the 
time of the original contract or the workload at the time of the modification should affect the 
terms of the modified contract. Moreover, the existence of the modification is, itself, an 
outcome that might be affected by workload, so sample selection is a concern when looking 
at the contractual terms of modifications. Within the class of definitive contracts, a given 
acquisition occurs either under simplified acquisitions procedures (for procurements below 
$150,000) or under general acquisitions procedures. Simplified definitive contracts are 
referred to as purchase orders and make up the majority of the definitive contracts (about 
1.3 million out of 1.4 million), but the minority of definitive procurement dollars (about $40 
billion out of $420 billion in the sample). 
In addition to the two sorts of definitive contracts, there is a third award type, referred 
to here as “delivery orders,” which consists of calls on IDVs. As discussed above, an IDV is 
an umbrella contract that specifies a framework under which a broad class of specific 
procurements can be made. A delivery order is a specific agreement to procure under the 
broad terms of the IDV, but under the further specific terms and conditions particular to that 
specific procurement. A delivery order is a contract in its own right, with its own terms and 
modifications, but the contracting officer does not start from scratch, so his flexibility is 
somewhat limited. These sorts of contracts are very important, making up over 3 million of 
the 4.6 million original contracts, and more than half of all procurement spending (about 
$800 billion out of the $1.45 trillion in procurement spending by the DoD in our sample 
years). 
There are four main features of contracts that contracting officers can adjust as their 
workloads vary. The first discretionary feature is the pricing structure. For simplicity, we 
divided the pricing structure of contracts into two broad categories: firm-fixed-price contracts 
and variable-price contracts. In fact, contracting officers can choose from a continuum of 
pricing structures, including firm fixed price; fixed price with various price adjustments, effort 
requirements, and incentive payments; cost plus fixed fee; cost plus various incentive fees; 
time and materials; and other various hybrid forms. Firm-fixed-price contracts make up 88% 
of all original contracts in our sample. The FAR specifies that agencies should use fixed-
price contracts when “the risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable 
degree of certainty.” Official government policy is to prefer firm-fixed-price contracts when 
possible (especially recently, with an order from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy). 
The second discretionary feature available to contracting officers is the extent to 
which the contract is competed. The most competitive option, called “full-and-open 
competition,” allows all responsible sources to compete. Full-and-open competition includes 
sealed bids, competitive proposals, and combinations of competitive procedures. 
Contracting officers can also choose a more limited form of competition, called “full-and-
open competition after exclusion of sources,” which prohibits some otherwise qualified 
sources from participating in the competition. Sources may be excluded if doing so would 
                                                
14 Details of matches are available by request. 
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reduce total costs without harming competition, aid national defense, maintain a reliable 
source, or fulfill a critical need. Officers are not required to report the reason for exclusion, 
but it is an optional data element. Among those who report (27%), the most commonly cited 
reasons are that a contract is a follow-on contract or has some unique sources. Finally, a 
contracting officer may choose not to compete a contract at all, either because a statue 
explicitly prohibits competition (not available for competition) or because only one source 
was solicited for reasons authorized by regulation and justified by the contracting officer (not 
competed). The most common justifications for not competing a contract are the availability 
of only one responsible source who can satisfy agency requirements and unusual and 
compelling urgency. 
Third, the extent to which a contracting officer completely specifies an original 
contract influences the probability of modification and the number of modifications of the 
original contract. There are several reported reasons for contract modifications. Over half of 
the reported modifications are strictly administrative, a funding-only action, or a closeout of a 
completed contract. But about 41% of modifications reflect a substantial change in the 
contract’s requirements: unilateral requests for additional work, change orders, the exercise 
of options, and bilateral supplemental agreements. The remaining 3% are an assortment of 
cancelations, terminations, and movements between definitive and indefinite contracts. 
Finally, the choices the contracting officer makes with respect to competition, pricing 
terms, and modifications influence the size of the government’s financial obligation from a 
contract. Every original contract has an initial level of expected obligation determined at the 
time of the contract award, which may be altered by later modifications. We looked at initial 
and final obligation separately, since the model predicts individual effects on each. 
Tables 1–3 present the summary statistics for the contract and agency features that 
form the basis for our regressions. Table 1 presents the statistics for definitive contracts. 
The two major columns divide these contracts into firm-fixed-price and variable-price 
contracts, while the sub-columns further divide them into contracts that are eventually 
modified and those which are not. Each row is the sample mean and standard deviation 
from the indicated variable in the appropriate subset of contracts. The top panel includes 
contract-level variables, while the bottom panel includes agency-level variables, averaged 
over all the contracts of the indicated type. Tables 2 and 3 are similarly structured, but for 
purchase orders and delivery orders, respectively. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=moldo^jW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -=363 - 
=
Table 1. Original Definitive Contracts 
Variable Price Firm-Fixed Price
 No Mod. Mod. No Mod. Mod. 
Pct. Mod. 









 (0.450)  (0.489) (0.493)  (0.488) 
Excl. of Sources 0.410  0.434 0.278  0.231 
 (0.492)  (0.496) (0.448)  (0.421) 
Not Comp. 0.0571  0.117 0.204  0.168 
 (0.232)  (0.322) (0.403)  (0.374) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.809  2.808 0.365  2.439 
 (8.471)  (40.61) (2.680)  (34.82) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 1.066  14.90 0.390  4.883 
 (8.724)  (188.9) (3.076)  (51.60) 
Modifications 0  4.806 0  3.438 
 (0)  (29.47) (0)  (6.393) 
Pct. Classified 0.138  0.127 0.0961  0.0837 
 (0.190)  (0.184) (0.143)  (0.159) 
Pct. 10–20 0.202  0.204 0.177  0.192 
 (0.0650)  (0.0554) (0.0530)  (0.0586) 
Pct. 20+ 0.514  0.531 0.529  0.537 
 (0.0865)  (0.0694) (0.101)  (0.0937) 
C. Officers 1105.2  1051.0 1346.9  940.6 
 (977.0)  (913.6) (1024.8)  (745.1) 
n 6794  11306 57394  37665 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for definitive contracts by pricing variety and eventual 
modification. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010), 
although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top panel variables are contract-level data 
elements and bottom panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted by the number of 
contracts. 
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Table 2. Purchase Orders 
 Variable Price Firm-Fixed Price 
 No Mod.  Mod. No Mod.  Mod. 
Pct. Mod. 









 (0.472)  (0.403) (0.497)  (0.479) 
Excl. of Sources 0.111  0.208 0.219  0.258 
 (0.314)  (0.406) (0.414)  (0.437) 
Not Comp. 0.438  0.458 0.197  0.330 
 (0.496)  (0.498) (0.398)  (0.470) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.125  0.0902 0.0248  0.0592 
 (2.948)  (0.299) (0.160)  (0.228) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 0.127  0.137 0.0252  0.0829 
 (2.949)  (0.437) (0.164)  (1.440) 
Modifications 0  1.819 0  1.430 
 (0)  (1.392) (0)  (1.023) 
Pct. Classified 0.0941  0.0623 0.0946  0.0598 
 (0.103)  (0.139) (0.107)  (0.135) 
Pct. 10–20 0.190  0.211 0.172  0.196 
 (0.0433)  (0.0530) (0.0558)  (0.0671)
Pct. 20+ 0.477  0.515 0.494  0.511 
 (0.0766)  (0.0725) (0.0829)  (0.101) 
C. Officers 819.6  1077.9 1748.8  891.7 
 (810.8)  (679.3) (1059.8)  (794.5) 
n 5200  1414 1.2M  143k 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for purchase orders by pricing variety and eventual 
modification. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010), 
although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top panel variables are contract-level data 
elements and bottom panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted by the number of 
contracts. 
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Table 3. Delivery Orders 
 Variable Price Firm-Fixed Price 











 (0.461)  (0.484) (0.458)  (0.491) 
Excl. of Sources 0.162  0.145 0.161  0.227 
 (0.369)  (0.352) (0.368)  (0.419) 
Not Comp. 0.114  0.138 0.0955  0.110 
 (0.318)  (0.345) (0.294)  (0.313) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.203  1.277 0.0920  0.728 
 (6.431)  (16.05) (1.169)  (8.833) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 0.225  3.168 0.0939  1.004 
 (6.508)  (50.02) (1.201)  (12.79) 
Modifications 0  2.446 0  1.846 
 (0)  (3.813) (0)  (2.385) 
Pct. Classified 0.112  0.0815 0.108  0.0775 
 (0.110)  (0.159) (0.0810)  (0.144) 
Pct. 10–20 0.184  0.202 0.163  0.195 
 (0.0593)  (0.0572) (0.0476)  (0.0584)
Pct. 20+ 0.499  0.544 0.482  0.509 
 (0.0719)  (0.0824) (0.0621)  (0.0892)
C. Officers 1811.2  808.5 2090.4  1046.8 
 (1027.6)  (773.5) (901.1)  (829.9) 
n 422k  77k 2.3M  241k 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for delivery orders by pricing variety and eventual 
modification. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010), 
although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top panel variables are contract-level data 
elements and bottom panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted by the number of 
contracts. 
For definitive contracts, 63% of the variable-price definitive contracts are eventually 
modified, while only 40% of the fixed-price definitive contracts are. This same pattern holds 
for the other two award types. We also see that, conditional on being modified, variable-
price contracts are modified more frequently. Finally, there appears to be bigger changes to 
the variable-price contracts, at least in terms of the change in dollars obligated between the 
initial and final levels. This pattern is consistent with the idea that contracting officers choose 
variable-price contracts if renegotiation is likely. 
The sample statistics reveal no obvious pattern of competition. For definitive 
contracts, the firm-fixed-price contracts appear to be more subject to full-and-open 
competition and less subject to exclusion of sources, but they are also more likely to be not 
competed at all. Purchase orders are similar, but for delivery orders there does not seem to 
be much difference in the use of competition among pricing terms. 
Now consider workload. Firm-fixed-price contracts are, on average, being written by 
agencies with more contracting officers, across all three award types. For definitive 
contracts, the average firm-fixed-price contract is written in an agency with 1,184 contracting 
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officers, while the average variable-price contract is written in an agency with 1,072 officers. 
The difference is even bigger for the other two award types. A similar pattern arises when 
comparing modified contracts to non-modified contracts within an award type and pricing 
class. For every award/pricing combination, except for variable-price purchase orders (of 
which there are only 6,600), the average non-modified contract was written in an agency 
with many more contracting officers than the average modified contract. Again, this pattern 
is consistent with the idea that agencies with many people to do the work write more 
complete contracts and make greater use of fixed-price contracts. 
Finally, consider the distribution of contractual terms when we consider only those 
contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Table 4 presents those data for all award types 
pooled together. Essentially, there are two sets of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. There 
are a handful (about 600) of enormous variable-price delivery orders written off the 
LOGCAP IV and related IDV umbrella contracts. These make up about 70% of the non-
classified procurement spending in our sample of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But 
even within this class there is some variation. For example, about a quarter of these delivery 
orders are executed as written, and it is still true that these unmodified contracts were 
written by agencies with more contracting officers on staff. The rest of the procurement in 
Iraq and Afghanistan is made up of a large collection of relatively small firm-fixed-price 
contracts (about 45,000). They are overwhelmingly subjected to full-and-open competition, 
rarely modified, and mostly consist of purchase orders and relatively small definitive 
contracts. 
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Table 4. Contracts Performed in Iraq or Afghanistan 
 Variable Price Firm-Fixed Price 
 No Mod.  Mod. No Mod.  Mod. 
Definitive 0 0.0409 0.163 0.290 
 (0) (0.198) (0.369) (0.454) 
Purch Order 0.00641 0.00430 0.656 0.525 
 (0.0801) (0.0655) (0.475) (0.499) 
Delivery 0.994 0.955 0.181 0.185 
 (0.0801) (0.208) (0.385) (0.388) 
Full and Open Comp. 0.801 0.845 0.992 0.971 
 (0.400) (0.362) (0.0914) (0.167) 
Excl. of Sources 0.128 0.0774 0.000960 0.00497 
 (0.335) (0.268) (0.0310) (0.0703) 
Not Comp. 0.0256 0.0624 0.00693 0.0186 
 (0.159) (0.242) (0.0830) (0.135) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 6.156 19.62 0.211 1.433 
 (16.30) (72.64) (2.754) (6.182) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 8.524 86.14 0.210 1.928 
 (33.29) (573.6) (3.080) (11.12) 
Modifications 0 5.065 0 2.064 
 (0) (7.449) (0) (6.007) 
Pct. Classified 0.222 0.273 0.000919 0.00642 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.0150) (0.0454) 
Pct. 10–20 0.181 0.188 0.171 0.178 
 (0.0460) (0.0458) (0.0110) (0.0235) 
Pct. 20+ 0.524 0.546 0.653 0.609 
 (0.0716) (0.0543) (0.0805) (0.0721) 
C. Officers 1645.7 1556.7 283.7 413.6 
 (1065.7) (987.8) (183.3) (399.3) 
n 156 465 42k 4631 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by 
pricing variety and eventual modification. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up 
to six years (2005–2010), although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top panel variables 
are contract-level data elements and bottom panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted 
by the number of contracts. 
Although the patterns in the sample statistics are broadly consistent with our 
explanation for the role of contracting officer workload, differences in sample means could 
very easily be driven by lots of factors that just happen to be correlated with the number of 
contracting officers. In the next section, we will control for many of these factors 
econometrically in order to uncover the direct relationship between workload and contractual 
terms. 
Econometric Specification of Workload 
Designing a measure of workload that is consistent across agencies and time is 
challenging for several reasons. For example, the problems of using straightforward 
workload measures, such as the number of contracts per officer or the dollars obligated per 
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officer, have been well established (Black, 1995; Reed, 2010; Warren, 2012) and are 
present here as well. The degree of contract complexity varies across agencies, so simply 
adding up the number of contracts or dollars would overstate the workload of officers in 
those agencies who have relatively simple tasks to perform and understate the workload of 
officers in those agencies with relatively complex tasks. Since contracting officers’ choices of 
the procurement and contractual terms are impacted by the product or service’s complexity, 
these simple measures of workload would produce biased results. As a result, we did not try 
to directly estimate the workload per officer. Instead, we focused on the impact of changes 
in the total number of contracting officers in an agency, while controlling for the number and 
mix of contracts the officers must manage. 
Others have attempted to create consistent measures of workload by applying an ex-
ante weighting scheme among contracts (Air Force Manpower & Innovation Agency 
[AFIMA], 2001; Reed, 2010). However these weighted measures of workload are infeasible 
for this study for a couple of reasons. First, some of these measures do not account for 
variance in cross-agency time use, and, therefore cannot be consistently applied in a cross-
agency study. Second, workload measures that can be applied consistently across agencies 
use weights that depend on the very outcomes we want to examine: dollars obligated, 
extent competed, and solicitation procedures. Using a workload measure that depends on 
any of these equilibrium outcomes would produce biased results. 
Given the problems with these ex-ante workload weights, we instead took a flexible 
approach, letting the data determine the work intensity of various contracting actions. To 
measure the workload, we included a variable for (the log of ) the number of contracting 
officers in each agency/year combination. To control for the contract mix, we counted the 
(log of ) the number of original contracts for each of 55 different product/services classes for 
each agency/year combination. These counts were then included in each regression as 55 
separate controls, indexed by j. 
Another concern with appropriately measuring workload is that many defense 
contracts are classified and are not reported for national security reasons. If the share of 
contracts varies across agencies, then our workload measures will understate the workload 
of agencies with many unreported contracts and overstate the workload of agencies with 
few or no classified contracts. To control for this, we included a proxy of the intensity of 
classification in the office—the fraction of the branch’s procurement budget that is classified 
in the fiscal year. Unfortunately, this measure is only available at the branch level (Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and other DoD) and not at the individual office level. 
Finally, every regression included measures of contracting-officer experience, 
including the fraction with 10–20 years of experience and the fraction with over 20 years of 
experience, agency fixed effects and trends, a year fixed effect, and product/service fixed 
effects. Formally, we estimated the following Fixed-Effects OLS (FE-OLS) equation for 
contract i in product class p in agency s in year t. 
(1) 
In Equation 1, employment (CO) and contract counts (X) are measured in logs; IA is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for a contract performed in Iraq or Afghanistan; E is the vector 
of experience controls; Cst is the share of classified procurement, γpst is the combination of 
three fixed effects (agency, year, and product class); κsyeart is an agency-specific year 
trend, and y is the outcome of interest. Across various contracting outcomes, our interest 
55 
yipst = β1 C Ost + β2C Ost ∗ I Aipst + ηI Aipst + δ0Est + ∑αj Xjst + σCst + γpst + κs yeart + εipst
j=1 
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was in estimating the βs, the effect of expanding the contracting workforce on that outcome. 
Intuitively, β reflects the change in contracting outcomes for an agency when its number of 
contracting officers deviates from trend, given contract load, mix, and experience, while 
controlling for agency, year, and product-specific factors. The errors among contracts in a 
given agency-year will likely be correlated, so we clustered our standard errors at the 
agency-year level for inference. 
The econometric approach here is very similar to that in Warren (2012), but it differs 
in two ways. First, we were not able to avail ourselves of Warren’s instrumental-variable 
strategy of using retirements as a shock to workload. Since the DoD procurement offices are 
much larger than those found in most civilian agencies, they have about three times as 
many GS-1102s, on average. By the law of large numbers, this increased size irons out 
much of the random variation in retirement rates. Unfortunately, this leads to a very weak 
and non-robust first-stage relationship between retirement rates and contracting-officer 
employment in the DoD agencies. Without an IV strategy, we are particularly concerned with 
omitted variable bias if agency mission changes over time (since that would not be captured 
in agency fixed effects). For this reason, we introduced a second difference from Warren—
the introduction of agency-specific time trends. This more flexible specification will be robust 
to omitted factors that vary within an agency, over time, as long as they trend roughly with 
time. Finally, it is important to note that the biases Warren uncovered for the OLS 
regressions were all biases toward zero, so if the underlying omitted variables are similar, 
here, we can at least sign the bias of our estimated coefficients. 
Results 
Modifications 
Table 5 outlines the estimated relationship between decreasing workload and the 
presence and number of substantive modifications or terminations. For this analysis, alone, 
we limited the sample to contracts written before 2009, since enough time must pass to 
observe any modifications. The first column presents estimates for the sample of definitive 
contracts, while the second and third present purchase orders and delivery orders, 
respectively. Our expectation was that busier contracting offices should write less complete 
contracts, leading to an increase in ex-post renegotiation that would be reflected in 
increased rates of modification and termination. 
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Table 5. The Effect of Workload on Renegotiation 
 Def. Contract Purch. Order Del. Order 
Panel A: Termination 






C. Officers x IorA 0.03∗ −0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Iraq or Af. −0.11 0.12 −0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 












Panel B: Any Substantive Modifications 






























Panel C: Number of Substantive Modifications 






C. Officers x IorA 0.16∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.14 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 






Pct. 10–20 0.51 0.95∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗ 
 (0.65) (0.32) (0.31) 






n 89k 0.97M 2.7M 
Notes. Panel A Dependent Variable: Indicator of a contractual termination. Panel B Dependent 
Variable: Indicator of a subsequent substantive modification. Panel C Dependent Variable: the log of 
one plus the number of substantive modifications. Definitive contracts are included in specification 
(1), Purchase Orders in specification (2), and Delivery Orders in specification (3). In addition to the 
tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 
product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed 
effects. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to four years (2005–2008). 
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *, **, *** represent significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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All three showed significant effects of workload on contract terminations, in the 
expected direction for non-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts. Increasing the number of contracting 
officers by about 10% when the original contract was signed decreased the probability that 
the contracted was later terminated by between 0.3–0.8 percentage points, on a mean of 
less than 1%. The relationship for contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan seemed a little weaker, 
but it is difficult to make much of these result, since less than 0.1% of such contracts are 
ever terminated. 
The results for modifications were more mixed. For definitive contracts and delivery 
orders, more contracting officers were associated with fewer modifications, along both the 
extensive and intensive margins. In particular, increasing the number of contracting officers 
by 10%, decreased the probability of modification by about 3–6 percentage points, and 
decreased the expected number of modifications by 10–20%. These relationships may be 
slightly weaker for contracts in Iraq/Afghanistan, but they were substantively quite similar. 
Purchase orders, by contrast, seemed to be more modified as workload declined, at least for 
contracts not performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq and Afghanistan, there seemed to 
be no relationship between workload and modification of purchase orders. 
To judge the size of these effects, about 10% of delivery contracts and purchase 
orders in the sample were modified at some point, while about 40% of definitive contracts 
were. The average delivery or purchase order had about 0.18 modifications, while the 
average definitive contracts had about 1.8. 
Consistent with the predictions of the model and the evidence for civilian agencies 
(Warren 2012), as workload declines, agencies seem to do a better job at foreseeing 
contingencies in the original contract and delivery orders, thereby limiting the need for ex-
post renegotiation or termination. This relationship also holds up for the presumably simpler 
acquisitions tasks of purchase orders, in the case of terminations, but seems to reverse for 
modifications. We saw this pattern throughout much of our analysis, where the model did 
well in prediction behavior on relatively difficult contracts, but fell short in explaining behavior 
on the simple purchase orders. 
Degree of Competition 
Table 6 outlines the estimated relationship between workload and the decision to 
award a contract by competitive mechanisms. For definitive contracts and delivery orders, 
more contracting officers were associated with increased use of competitive procurement 
mechanisms. In particular, increasing the number of contracting officers by 10% increased 
the probability of full-and-open competition by between about 2–4 percentage points, 
decreased the use of competition with excluded sources by about 1 percentage point, and 
decreased the probability that a contract was not competed at all by between 1–2 
percentage points. The effects may be slightly stronger for contracts performed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but the difference was not substantively very large. To give a sense of 
magnitudes, about 40% of definitive contracts and 69% of delivery orders were fully and 
openly competed, while about 28% and 17%, respectively, were competed after exclusion. 
Finally, about 10% of delivery orders and 18% of definitive contracts were not competed at 
all. Again, we found no consistent relationship between workload and competition for 
purchase orders. 
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Table 6. The Effect of Workload on Competition 
 Def. Contract Purch. Order Del. Order 
Panel A: Full-and-Open Competition 
C. Officers 0.37∗∗∗ 0.03 0.18∗∗∗ 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.04) 
C. Officers x IorA 0.11∗∗ −0.24 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.18) (0.06) 
Iraq or Af. −0.37 2.03∗ 0.18 
 (0.34) (1.23) (0.43) 
Pct. 10–20 0.32 0.12 0.18∗ 
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.10) 






Panel B: Competition with Exclusion 






C. Officers x IorA −0.02 0.09 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 












Pct. 20+ 0.07 0.61∗∗ −0.05 
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.06) 
Panel C: Not Competed 
C. Officers −0.18∗∗ 0.12 −0.10∗∗ 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) 
C. Officers x IorA −0.06 0.07 −0.05 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) 
Iraq or Af. 0.37 −0.54 0.36 
 (0.35) (0.99) (0.37) 






Pct. 20+ 0.03 −0.33∗∗ −0.12∗ 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.07) 
n 113k 1.36M 3.03M 
Notes. Dependent variable: Indicator of use of given level competition. Not available for competition is 
the excluded class. Definitive contracts are included in specification (1), Purchase Orders in 
specification (2), and Delivery Orders in specification (3). In addition to the tabulated regressors, each 
specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 product/service groups, 
product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed effects. The full sample 
includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010). Standard errors, in 
parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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This shift toward competitive acquisitions procedures as the contracting workforce 
increases is exactly what the model predicts and is consistent with the results for civilian 
agencies (Warren, 2012). 
Pricing Structure 
Table 7 presents the estimated relationship between decreasing workload and the 
pricing structure chosen by the contracting officer. Agencies with more contracting officers 
than we would expect, given their mix of contracts, seemed to be less likely to use firm-
fixed-price contracts, at least for definitive contracts and purchase orders performed outside 
of Iraq and Afghanistan and for delivery orders performed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Increasing 
the number of contracting officers by 10% was associated with a decrease in the use of firm-
fixed-price contracts of between 2–3 percentage points. This was on a mean of about 83% 
for delivery orders and definitive contracts, and a mean of more than 99.5% for purchase 
orders. Note, however, that within Iraq and Afghanistan, these rates rose to nearly 100% for 
definitive contracts and purchase orders, and to 93% for delivery orders, so the coefficients 
for the Iraq/Afghanistan sample should be interpreted with care. 
Table 7. The Effect of Workload on Contract Pricing 
 Def. Contract Purch. Order Del. Order 
Use of Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts 





C. Officers x IorA 0.04 0.02∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗ 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.08) 












Pct. 20+ −0.05 0.03 −0.46 
 (0.14) (0.06) (0.29) 
n 113k 1.36M 3.03M 
Notes. Dependent variable: Indicator of use of a firm-fixed-price contract. Definitive contracts are 
included in specification (1), Purchase Orders in specification (2), and Delivery Orders in specification 
(3). In addition to the tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of 
original contacts in 55 product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and 
trends, and year fixed effects. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six 
years (2005–2010). Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Nevertheless, this result is quite at odds with the prediction of the model and the 
evidence in civilian agencies from Warren (2012). This divergence suggests that our 
framework may be ignoring some factor guiding the pricing decisions in the DoD that was 
not in play in the civilian agencies. As discussed in the Complex Contracting Environments 
section, many fixed-price contracts written by the DoD are highly cost based and, therefore, 
depress the cost-saving incentives generated by more typical fixed-price contracts. As fixed-
price contracts become more like cost-plus contracts, the estimated effect of workload 
should fall toward zero as contracting officers become indifferent between fixed-price 
contracts and cost-plus contracts. However, this story cannot explain why the estimated 
effect shifted from positive to negative. 
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Obligations 
Table 8 outlines the estimated relationship between workload and the initial and final 
amount obligated on the contract, taking into account later adjustments when applicable. For 
definitive contracts and purchase orders, outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of more 
contracting officers was associated with lower initial and final obligations, although the effect 
was bigger for initial than for final obligations. The relationship seemed to be weaker for 
contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but for definitive contracts, at least, it was still 
quite large. For definitive contracts, increasing the number of contracting officers by 10% 
would decrease initial obligations by 5–6.5% and decrease final obligations by about 5%. 
These results are consistent with the model and the results for civilian agencies (Warren, 
2012). 
Table 8. The Effect of Workload on Obligations 
 Def. Contract Purch. Order Del. Order 
Panel A: Initial Dollars Obligated 





C. Officers x IorA 0.17 0.06 0.41∗ 
 (0.17) (0.38) (0.24) 
Iraq or Af. 0.24 0.20 −0.64 
 (1.13) (2.60) (1.61) 






Pct. 20+ 0.11 0.31∗ −0.76 
 (0.53) (0.19) (0.65) 
Panel B: Total Dollars Obligated 
C. Officers −0.55∗∗ −0.14 0.06 
 (0.26) (0.10) (0.18) 
C. Officers x IorA 0.07 0.11 0.43 
 (0.21) (0.40) (0.27) 
Iraq or Af. 0.58 −0.15 −0.75 
 (1.40) (2.72) (1.82) 
Pct. 10–20 −1.03 0.42∗ 0.16 
 (0.74) (0.24) (0.81) 






n 113k 1.36M 3.03M 
Notes. Dependent variables: The natural log of the initial and final (to date) obligations, measured in 
real 2009 dollars. Definitive contracts are included in specification (1), Purchase Orders in 
specification (2), and Delivery Orders in specification (3). In addition to the tabulated regressors, each 
specification includes the log of the number of original contacts in 55 product/service groups, 
product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed effects. The full sample 
includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010). Standard errors, in 
parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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There was some evidence that the relationship could go the other way for delivery 
orders, at least in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the effect was not quite statistically 
significant at conventional levels. This interaction is particularly interesting because it 
suggests that increases in the size of the contracting workforce are unlikely to lead to much 
cost cutting on the large delivery orders that make up such a large part of the procurement 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Contract Types 
To this point, we have analyzed the three major contract award types in parallel. For 
many procurement decisions, the contracting award type is more or less dictated by the 
object and context of the procurement. But there are always marginal cases, and it is 
important to understand the patterns of substitution among the award type for at least two 
reasons. First, one of the worries cited by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (2011) is that inadequate staffing of contracting offices operating in Iraq 
and Afghanistan has led them to depend inappropriately on the use of delivery orders, when 
one-off definitive contracts would have been more appropriate. We can investigate this 
question empirically. 
Second, in the previous analysis, we sometimes found that the relationship between 
workload and contracting outcomes differed by award type. If there were big substitutions 
among award types, we might worry that these difference were simply due to sample 
selection. Take the example of modification. We found that higher workload was associated 
with more modification of delivery orders and definitive contracts, and lower modification of 
purchase orders. If we found that increased workload was also associated with substitution 
from purchase orders relative to those other two award types, we might worry that there is 
no real effect on modification and, instead, the contracting officers are simply changing the 
contracts they are likely to eventually modify from delivery orders or definitive contracts into 
purchase orders. 
In fact, we found that all the substitution seems to occur between definitive contracts 
and delivery orders. Table 9 presents these estimates, where each column is a single 
regression with an indicator for the named award type as the dependent variable. For 
contracts not performed in Iraq or Afghanistan, we found that having more contracting 
officers is associated with an increased use of definitive contracts and a decreased use of 
delivery contracts. There was no statistically significant evidence of a change in the 
frequency of purchase orders. Increasing the number of contracting officers in an agency by 
about 10% would increase the use of definitive contracts by about 0.6 percentage points, 
decrease the use of delivery orders by about 1.2 percentage points, and increase the use of 
purchase orders by (a statistically insignificant) 0.6 percentage points. On average, only 
about 2.5% of original contracts were definitive contracts, 67% were delivery orders, and 
30% were purchase orders. 
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Table 9. The Effect of Workload on Award Type 
 Def. Contract Purch. Order Del. Order 
C. Officers 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.12∗∗∗ 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
C. Officers x IorA −0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 


















n  4.5M  
Notes. Dependent variable: An indicator of the specified award type: Definitive contracts are in 
specification (1), Purchase Orders in specification (2), and Delivery Orders in specification (3). In 
addition to the tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original 
contacts in 55 product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, 
and year fixed effects. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years 
(2005–2010). Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Although this substitution among award types is not formally explored in the model, 
we believe it is consistent in spirit. If we think about delivery orders as starting off with a 
partially written contract and simply filling in the details, their use might be particularly 
attractive to a heavily burdened contracting officer, relative to a definitive contract that he 
would need to write from scratch and award independently. 
For contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the case that brought this issue to the front of 
the policy debate, we actually found very little. Certainly, there was no significant difference 
in the use of definitive contracts as workload changed. There may be some substitution 
toward delivery orders and away from purchase orders as workload increases, but the 
estimates were not statistically significant. We conclude that the case arguing that this sort 
of substitution is particularly rampant for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan is 
weak. On the contrary, our data suggest that it is a general fact about contracting and, if 
anything, is less evident for contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored how the variation in contracting officer workload in the DoD 
is related to contractual outcomes. We found evidence that higher workloads induce 
contracting officers to write less complete contracts. This reduction in contractual 
completeness increases the probability of modification, so contracting officers are less likely 
to award contracts through full-and-open competition. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we 
found a positive relationship between workload and the use of fixed-price contracts. Some of 
this relationship between workload may be attributable to the combination of sole-source 
environments and the Truth in Negotiations Acts that mitigate the advantages of fixed-price 
contracts over more flexible cost-plus contracts. Finally, we found that when workload is 
high, contracting officers are more likely to make calls on existing indefinite-delivery vehicles 
rather than write and award new definitive contracts. With the exception of pricing terms, our 
results square directly with the parallel analysis of civilian contracting offices in Warren 
(2012). 
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This paper also addressed a pressing policy question about the drivers of sub-
optimal procurement outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan contracts. We found that decreasing 
workload increases the use of competition, increases the probability and frequency of 
renegotiation, and reduces the initial and final price paid. However, with the exception of 
competition, the effect of workload is more important for contracts procured outside of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
Moreover, in contrast to the conclusion of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (2011), we did not find significant evidence that higher workload 
causes contracting officers to prefer indefinite-delivery vehicles over definitive contracts. Our 
results suggest that increases in the size of the acquisitions workforce will affect domestic 
procurement at least as much as it will affect procurement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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Appendix 
Table 10. Agencies in Sample 
Agency Name Pct. Purch Pct. Deliv. Pct. Def. I or A Contracts. Contracts C. Off. 
U.S. AF, Europe 48.2 48.9 2.9 11 22, 809 55 
Air Education and Training Command 39.2 57.2 3.6 106 46, 169 350 
Headquarters, Air Force Reserve 30.5 61.1 8.4 0 6, 776 102 
Pacific Air Forces 35.4 62.0 2.6 0 22, 805 93 
Air Combat Command 38.2 57.0 4.8 0 33, 456 298 
Air Force Materiel Command 32.1 58.7 9.2 357 157, 565 2455 
Space Command 24.8 68.4 6.8 0 19, 139 540 
Air Force, District of Washington 27.4 65.7 6.9 4 6, 678 60 
U.S. Army Contracting Agency 39.7 55.4 4.8 391 285, 409 1351 
U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center 66.3 15.8 17.9 43, 775 43, 776 256 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 32.7 61.7 5.7 1, 704 107, 935 846 
U.S. Army Medical 56.5 41.2 2.3 1 36, 008 244 
Army National Guard Units 41.0 56.3 2.7 1 95, 487 263 
Space and Missile Defense 15.3 58.7 26.0 4 3, 106 60 
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive 36.1 54.1 9.9 12 50, 487 776 
U.S. Army J Munitions 36.9 56.3 6.8 38 4, 489 242 
Defense Information Systems Agency 19.9 79.5 0.7 102 49, 382 254 
Defense Logistics Agency 25.3 74.0 0.7 204 2, 729, 894 2564 
DARPA 12.2 23.6 64.2 0 1, 166 12 
Washington Headquarters Services 19.2 67.6 13.2 3 5, 458 36 
Missile Defense Agency 5.8 40.6 53.6 0 1, 952 111 
Defense Commissary 3.0 96.3 0.7 0 52, 826 95 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 26.9 59.5 13.7 0 2, 912 67 
Office of Naval Research 57.5 31.3 11.2 1 23, 460 109 
Naval Medical 48.9 50.2 0.9 0 63, 631 105 
Naval Air Systems 33.7 54.9 11.3 6 39, 757 539 
Naval Supply Systems 50.3 45.4 4.4 10 281, 770 576 
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Naval Sea Systems 46.4 49.9 3.7 6 88, 467 515 
Naval Facilities Engineering 8.8 85.1 6.1 6 100, 438 899 
U.S. Marine Corps 42.7 55.1 2.2 49 82, 320 252 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems 29.4 68.5 2.1 150 89, 056 201 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet 21.4 71.7 6.9 0 11, 694 85 
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